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TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964:
OBTAINING JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS
WHO WERE NOT NAMED AS RESPONDENTS
IN A CHARGE TO THE EEOC

INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 makes discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin an unlawful
employment practice.2 It is the most comprehensive legislation
ever enacted to eliminate private employment discrimination. 8
Discrimination in hiring, firing, promoting, granting privileges and
compensation is prohibited, as is any form of segregation or classification which would "deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee .... ,4 Section 2000e-5 of the Act specifies the provisions a person claiming to have been discriminated against must
follow to come within the protection of the statute.5 Because of
1.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964)

[hereinafter referred to as Title

VII of the Act].
2. Id. § 2000e-2. This section specifically prohibits discrimination by
employers, employment agencies and labor organizations. Section 2000e
limits the definition of "employer" to those "engaged in an industry affecting commerce" with twenty-five or more employees. Federal, state and
local governments are excluded from this definition, as are private membership clubs (other than labor organizations) which are tax exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1964).
Additional exemptions are made in section 2000e-2(e) where religion,
sex or national origin-but not race-is a bona fide occupational qualification. For a rather critical discussion of these and other exceptions to
Title VII coverage see Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications,
7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 473 (1966).
3.

M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DIsCRIMINATIoN IN EM-

PLOYMENT (1966):

Equal employment opportunity measures have taken many
forms, including, most recently, a federal statute. Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the first comprehensive equal employment opportunity law ever passed by Congress.
Id. at 8.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
5. An aggrieved party must file a written charge, under oath, with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter referred to as
the Commission] within 90 days of the alleged discriminatory act. If the
act occurred in a jurisdiction which has a state or local fair employment
practice law, the aggrieved party must first file his charge with the appropriate state or local agency. Where the charge has been deferred to a
state or local agency the time limit for filing with the Commission is extended to 210 days or 30 days after the aggrieved party has been informed
of the termination of state or local action, whichever is sooner. If, after a
maximum of 60 days, the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary

"the ambiguous structure of the enforcement provisions of Title
VII, '"6 most of the cases dealing with charges of employment discrimination have involved procedural questions. 7 In fact, "[o]nly
a few Title VII cases have been decided on the merits." The problem faced by the courts in determining procedural questions, caused
by the absence of clear statutory guidelines, is compounded by the
conflicting legislative history of the Act which seems to offer

something for everyone. 9
The right to employment free from discrimination is wholly
statutory. Therefore, each person bringing an action in a district
court for redress of alleged employment discrimination, pursuant
to section 2000e-5(e) of the Act, must have complied with all the
jurisdictional prerequisites specified in the statute. After several
compliance with the Act through the informal methods of "conference,
conciliation and persuasion," the aggrieved party is so notified and has 30
days to file a civil action in federal district court against the respondent
named in his charge to the Commission. Id. § 2000e-5.
6. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn.
1966).
7. For an early view of some of the procedural problems presented by § 2000e-5 see Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement
Procedures and Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 495 (1966).
For later discussions of general procedural problems see Berg, Title VII-A
Three Years' View, 44 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 311 (1969); Coleman, Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act: Four Years of Procedural Elucidation, 8 DuQUESNE L. REV. 1 (1969-70).

An extensive list of cases dealing with Title

VII procedure is given in Comment, A Primer to Procedure and Remedy
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 U. PiTt. L. REv. 407,
436-42 (1970).
8. Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Present Operation and Proposals for Improvement, 5 COLUM. J.L. & SOC'L PROBLEMS 1, 48 (1969).

9. For example, during the debate on the bill Senator Sam J. Ervin
stated that
the Commission holds the key to the courthouse door, which cannot
be unlocked for the aggrieved party's benefit unless the Commission finds that there is reasonable cause to believe the employer
guilty of the charge of discrimination and fails to adjust the com-

plaint by conciliation.
110 CONG. REC. 14188 (1964). In contrast Senator Jacob Javits stated:
In short the Commission does not hold the key to the courthouse
door. The only thing this title gives the Commission is time in
which to find that there has been a violation and time in which to
seek conciliation.
But

. . .

that is not a condition precedent to the action of taking a

defendant into court. A complainant has the absolute right to go
into court and this provision does not affect that right at all.
Id. at 14191. Likewise, Senator Hubert Humphrey, who was floor leader of
the bill, stated:

The individual may proceed in his own right at any time. He
may take his complaint to the Commission, he may by-pass the
Commission, or he may go directly to the court.
Id. at 14188.
See Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645, 649-51 (4th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, Pilot Freight Carriers Inc. v. Walker, 394 U.S. 918
(1969); Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F. Supp. 258, 262-63
(E.D. La. 1967), rev'd sub nom. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d
496 (5th Cir. 1968). For a complete account of the lengthy and involved

legislative history leading to the enactment of Title VII see Vass, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 431 (1966).
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years of litigation most courts have settled on two statutory prerequisites which must be met before they will allow a civil action
under Title VII: (1) the aggrieved person must have filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission naming the
parties charged with discrimination within the time limits prescribed in the Act; 10 and (2) the complainant must have received
notice from the Commission that it was unable to secure voluntary
compliance with the Act."
After these two requirements have
been fulfilled, the aggrieved person has thirty days to file a complaint in a district court. 1 2 In determining whether these prerequisites have been properly met, courts have often been forced to
choose between enforcing the underlying purpose of the statute, the
elimination of all forms of employment discrimination, or strictly
following the rather restrictive enforcement procedures specified
in section 2000e-5.1 3 Although a number of procedural areas are
still unsettled, an increasing number of courts have liberally construed the requirements of section 2000e-5 to permit the action to
14
be maintained.
One area of Title VII procedure which has not generally been
liberally construed, however, is the requirement embodied in the
first prerequisite that all persons who are named in a complaint to
a district court must have previously been named as respondents
in a charge to the Commission.1" Courts initially dealing with this
problem held that any person who was not a respondent in the
initial charge to the Commission could not be joined as a defendant
in a subsequent court action since this would circumvent the statutory preference for "conference, conciliation and persuasion" by
the Commission as the primary method of eliminating employment
discrimination.' 6 While this is still the prevailing view, several re10. Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir.
1969). For the time limits prescribed by section 2000e-5 see note 5
SUpra.
11. Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1969).
12. Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 288 n.21, 291 (5th
Cir. 1969); Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F. Supp. 258, 263 (E.D.
La. 1967).
13. See note 5 supra.
14. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1969); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Dent
v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Seaboard
Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398
F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968). For a discussion of the trend toward a more flexible interpretation of Title VII procedure, see Section III of this Comment.
15. This requirement is drawn from section 2000e-5(e), discussed
at text accompanying notes 28-31 infra.
16. Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969);

cent cases have permitted the joinder of unnamed parties at the
trial stage in certain circumstances. 17 This Comment will examine
both lines of authority, the rationale behind the holdings, the burden placed on persons aggrieved by the requirement that all parties
be named versus the desirability of having all parties before the
Commission, and methods of obtaining jurisdiction over those who
were not originally named in the charge to the Commission.
I. How

THE PROBLEM ARISES

One of the reasons Congress established the Commission as the
prime method for the settlement of employment discrimination
charges was to provide "an inexpensive and uncomplicated remedy
for aggrieved parties, most of whom were poor and unsophisticated."18 While some charges have been filed by civil rights groups
on behalf of aggrieved parties, "the average complainant is not initially represented by counsel, has no knowledge of the niceties of
the statute, and generally makes his 'charge' in a crude homemade
fashion."1 9 The result of these "homemade" charges has been that
in many instances parties involved in the discriminatory practice,
and who should be defendants in any civil action, have been
20
omitted from the initial complaint.
Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Mickel v. South
Carolina State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 877 (1967); Butler v. Local 4, Laborers' Union, 308 F. Supp. 528
(N.D. Ill. 1969); Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 299 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.
Mo. 1969); Spell v. Local 77, IATSE,
F. Supp.
, 71 L.R.R.M. 2811
(D.C.N.J. 1969); Samuel v. Wannamaker, Inc.,
F. Supp.
, 70 L.R.R.M.
2637 (D.C.S.C. 1968); Edmonson v. Wackenhut Corp.,
F. Supp.
, 2
F.E.P. Cases 39 (M.D. Fla. 1968); Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., 286 F. Supp.
775 (D. Minn. 1968); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74
(N.D. Ind. 1968); Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F. Supp. 258
(E.D. La. 1967); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 271 F. Supl, 27 (E.D.N.C.
1967); Freese v. John Morrell & Co.,
F. Supp.
,70 L.R.R.M. 2924 (S.D.
Iowa 1966).
17. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970);
McDonald v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 308 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Ill.
1970); State v. Baugh Constr. Co., 313 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Wash. 1969);
Bremer v. St. Louis S.W.R.R., 310 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Taylor v.
Armco Steel Corp.,
F. Supp.
, 60 CCH Lab. Cas.
9266 (S.D. Tex.
1969).
18. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 486 (7th Cir. 1970).
19. Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950, 953 (N.D. Ga.
1968), aff'd, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969). The Act provides for court appointed counsel "in such circumstances as the court may deem just," when
the action is filed with the district court, but not before. 42 U.S.C.
§ 200Oe-5(e) (1964).
20. By far the most common defect in charges made to the Commission relating to the naming of respondents has been the failure of the complainant to name his union in addition to his employer as the discriminating party. See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th
Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969);
Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 414 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1969); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Edmonson v. Wackenhut
, 2 F.E.P. Cases 39 (M.D. Fla. 1968); Cox v. United
Corp.,
F. Supp.
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In the leading case of Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service,21 the aggrieved party was seeking a job with Exide
Battery Service, who had registered with the State Employment
Service as a prospective employer. When the State Employment
Service repeatedly refused to administer the necessary aptitude tests
or refer her to Exide, she filed a charge with the Commission alleging discrimination by the State Employment Service but failed
to name Exide as a respondent in the charge. When the Commission was unable to arrive at a suitable conciliation, the aggrieved
party filed suit in district court. At trial, the district court granted
Exide's motion for summary judgment which was upheld on appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals:
[I] t is a sufficient basis for our decision that Exide was not
"named in the charge" filed with the Commission, and the
Commission was not required
22 to enter into any conciliatory negotiations with Exide.
The real danger for those who file incomplete charges is that
the defendant they fail to name as a respondent in their charge to
the Commission may be an "indispensable party" under Rule 19 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 23 Should the court follow the
prevailing view and refuse to take jurisdiction over the unnamed
States Gypsum Co., 384 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ind. 1968); Freese v. John Morrell & Co.,
F. Supp.
, 70 L.R.R.M. 2924 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
Other instances where charges to the Commission failed to name all
parties: McDonald v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 308 F. Supp. 664
(N.D. Ill. 1970) (local union and international union named in charge; recording secretary of local union not named): Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp.,
F. Supp. , 60 CCH Lab. Cas.
9266 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (employer and
local union named in charge; international union not named); Local 329,
ILA v. South Atl. & Gulf Coast Dist., ILA, 295 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex.
1968) (union district council named in the charge; various local unions who
are members of the district council not named).
21. 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1967).
22. Id. at 242.
23. Rule 19, "Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication," is
stated as follows:
(a)
Persons to be Joined if Feasible.
A person ...
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in
his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring ...
inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. ...
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible.
If a person as described in subdivision (a) (1) -(2)
hereof
cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity
and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties
before it, or should be dismissed, the absent party being thus regarded is indispensable.
FED. R. Crv. P. 19.

party, it would be forced to dismiss the entire complaint since all
parties "needed for just adjudication" under Rule 19(b) are not
before the court. If, in such a circumstance, the time limit for filing
charges as set out in section 2000e-5 had elapsed since the alleged
discriminatory practice occurred, 24 the aggrieved party would be
left without a remedy, since it would then be too late to file new
25
charges with the Commisson.
II.

THE PREVAILING VIEW

Federal courts in the third, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth
circuits have held that each defendant in a Title VII suit must have
been made a respondent in a charge to the Commission as a jurisdictional prerequisite to any civil action. 26 This view is founded on
a judicial interpretation of Title VII which emphasizes conciliation
by the Commission as the primary means of securing compliance
27
with the employment discrimination provisions of the Act.

The statutory basis for the majority view is found in section
2000e-5 (e):
If.

.

. the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary

compliance with this title, the Commission shall so notify
the person aggrieved and a civil action may, within thirty
days thereafter,
be brought against the respondent named
28
in the charge.
Most courts interpret this language to mean that only the respondent to the charge can be named as a defendant. 29 One of the first
procedural determinations made concerning Title VII was that all
complaints must go through the Commission to afford a chance for
voluntary settlement.30 There is no language in the statute which
specifically requires resort to the Commission as a prerequisite to
court action. The courts have concluded, however, that the elaborate administrative machinery established in the Act for the settlement of discrimination charges is a clear indication that Congress
intended resort to the Commission for settlement by "conference,
conciliation and persuasion" to be a prerequisite to the filing of a
civil action."' When faced with a suit that includes parties who
24.

See note 5 supra.

25. This is exactly the result reached by the district court in Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 301 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd, 427 F.2d
476 (7th Cir. 1970). The decision in the Waters case is discussed in the

text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
26. Cases cited note 16 supra.
27. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th
Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir.
1968).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964) (emphasis added).
29. Cases cited note 16 supra.
30. Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967).
31. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 486 (7th Cir. 1970).
This method of discerning Congressional intent is much more persuasive
than relying on the conflicting statements made during the Senate debate
on Title VII. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
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were not named in the charge to the Commission, most courts have
coupled the reasoning requiring the filing of a charge and the language of section 2000e-5 (e) authorizing civil actions "against the
respondent named in the charge" to dismiss the action against the
unnamed party. 32 Since the unnamed defendant has never been
before the Commission and was not included in the attempts at
voluntary settlement, the prevailing view is that the jurisdictional
prerequisites to suit have not been met as to that defendant.
In Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 38 the court was faced with
a complaint against a defendant who was not a respondent to the
charge before the Commission. The plaintiffs' charge to the Commission named the employer as the respondent but did not name
the union. At trial the plaintiffs sought to join the union as a defendant. Following the prevailing rule, the court refused to take
jurisdiction over the union. Even though it recognized "that the
Union was not entirely blamelesss in permitting discrimination to
exist and could have worked harder to eliminate the residual and
continuing effects of the blatant prior discrimination,"3 4 the court
refused to hold the union liable for any damages resulting from the
discrimination, since the union had never been named in a charge
'3 5
to the Commission as a "party in violation of Title VII.
In addition to the purely statutory reasons for requiring resort
to the Commission, several other reasons for requiring conciliation
have been advanced. An informal settlement through Commission
mediation is advantageous for the party charged with employment
discrimination since he is able to avoid the stigma of a public action
for discriminatory practices. 36 Section 2000e-5 (a) makes all proceedings before the Commission confidential.3 7 Commission hearings and attempts at conciliation are not even admissible as evidence in subsequent proceedings without the written consent of the
parties.3 8 Where conciliation is successful, it also benefits the aggrieved party. A voluntary settlement will minimize the antagonism between the parties while "more coercive remedies [are]
32. See cases cited note 16 supra.
33. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
34. Id. at 719.
35. Id. Less than a year later the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed itself on this point, at least where the attempt to join an unnamed
defendant was coupled with an allegation of jurisdiction under section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964), formerly 14 Stat. 27
(1866). Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
See discussion at notes 132 to 140 and accompanying text infra.
36. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 486 (7th Cir.
1970).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
38.

Id.

likely to enflame respondents and encourage them to employ subtle
forms of discrimination."' 9

III. PROCEDURAL

REQUIREMENTS LIBERALLY INTERPRETED

One interesting facet of the prevailing view is that a number of
the courts which have strictly interpreted the provisions of section
2000e-5(e) to prohibit the joinder of parties who were not respondents in the charge to the Commission have been quite flexible
in their interpretation of other procedural requirements of the
Act. 40 In Choate v. CaterpillarTractor Co.,41 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that despite the language of section 2000e5 (a) 42 which requires the charge to the Commission to be "in writing under oath," failure of the aggrieved party to swear to the
43
charge was not a jurisdictional defect.
Another procedural area which has been liberally interpreted
involves the joinder of plaintiffs in cases arising under Title VII.
Although the enforcement provisions of Title VII do not specifically
authorize its use, the class action 44 has been allowed in employment
discrimination cases. 45 Not only are class actions maintainable,
but membership in the class is not restricted to those parties who
have previously filed charges before the Commission, as long as one
member of the class has filed a charge with the Commission. 46 This
conclusion was reached in Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co.,47 where
the court not only allowed plaintiffs who had not filed charges
with the Commission to join in a class action but granted affirmative relief for the non-filing members in the form of back pay. 48
39.
1970).
40.
41.
42.
43.

Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 486-87 (7th Cir.
Cases cited note 14 supra.
402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1969):

Given the fact that the administrative remedy alone may be in-

sufficient to vindicate the rights of aggrieved parties, we believe
that it would be unnecessarily harsh and in derogation of the interests of those whom the act was designed to protect to interpret
the statutory language as denying substantive rights in the district
court because of procedural defects before the Commission....
To deny relief under these circumstances [failure to swear to
charge filed with Commission] would be a meaningless triumph
of form over substance.
Id. at 360.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b) specifies the instances when a class
action may be maintained.
45. See, e.g., Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966).
46. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968):
"It would be wasteful, if not in vain, for numerous employees, all with the
same grievance, to have to process many identical complaints with the
EEOC."

Id. at 498.

47. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
48. Id. at 720. The court, however, followed the prevailing view in
refusing to permit the plaintiffs to join their union as a defendant in this
suit, since the union had not been named in the plaintiffs' charge to the
Commission. See notes 33 to 35 and accompanying text supra.
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A third area where the courts have interpreted the procedural
language of section 2000e-5 as directory rather than mandatory
involves the necessity of actual Commission conciliation as a prerequisite to the filing of a charge. An early district court case,
Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.,49 held that the language of section 200Oe-5(e) made conciliation attempts a "jurisdictional prerequisite to the institution of a civil action under Title VII
and that actions instituted without this prerequisite must accordingly be dismissed."5 0 This case was reversed on appeal5 1 and a
number of other cases have rejected actual Commission conciliation
as a prerequisite to civil action. 52 This liberal interpretation was
adopted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Miller v. International PaperCo.55 to permit a suit against an employer where the
54
Commission had made no attempt at conciliation.
A procedural area where the courts are still in conflict involves
the necessity of a Commission determination that there is reasonable cause to believe a violation of the Act has occurred. 5 Several
49. 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
50. Id. at 58.
51. Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969).
52. See, e.g., Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
271 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Va. 1967); Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271
F. Supp. 258 (E.D. La. 1967).
53. 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
54. The court in Miller stated:
Granting that conciliation is important and that it precedes court
action, the question is, what effect should the EEOC's failure to
conciliate have upon the charging party's right to file suit? The
appellees assume a crushing burden when they attempt to convince
this court that the value of conciliation should supercede the
value of enforcement. The means devised cannot be more important than the end envisioned. We do not believe that the procedures of Title VII were intended to serve as a stumbling block
to the accomplishment of a statutory objective.
Id. at 290. In spite of this ruling that actual Commission action on the
complaint filed against the employer was unnecessary, the court refused
to take jurisdiction over the union involved because it had not been named
as a respondent in a charge to the Commission. The court reasoned that
to allow an action against a party who had not been named in a charge to
the Commission would "virtually eliminate the Commission established by
Congress to encourage fair employment practices." Id. at 285, 291.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a) (1964) provides that the Commission "shall
endeavor to eliminate any . . . unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion." First, however,
it must make an investigation based on the charge and determine that
"there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true." Where a
finding of "no reasonable cause" is made, the Commission so notifies the
complainant and no further Commission action is taken. In fiscal 1969 the
Commission received 17,272 charges of employment discrimination; in
2,801 cases the Commission ruled that it had "no probable jurisdiction"
over the charge. 4 EEOC ANN.REP. 34 (1969).

courts,5 6 and at least one commentator, 51 have held that a finding of
reasonable cause by the Commission is a prerequisite to judicial enforcement. The opposite interpretation, which is the view taken
by the Commission,58 is that an aggrieved party may bring his action in federal court despite a Commission finding of "no reasonable
cause."5 9
It is submitted that the better interpretation permits court action even where the Commission has found "no reasonable cause"
to believe a violation of the Act exists. A requirement that the
Commission find "reasonable cause" in every instance before court
action is permissible is an over-extension of the Commission's delegated powers of "conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 60
Thus, whenever possible, most courts have chosen to enforce the
underlying purpose of the statute rather than deny the substantive
relief it provides because of procedural errors and defects. Two
prominent factors in the evolution of this liberal interpretation
are the lay-drafted charges to the Commission, which often contain
defects in form and content, and the overwhelming number of complaints made to the Commission, which has overburdened its staff
to the point where it is impossible to attempt serious conciliation
efforts in many instances.61 In light of these factors and the liberal
interpretation given to most of the procedural aspects of Title VII,
it is necessary to re-examine the rationale behind the prevailing
view that no action can be maintained against a defendant who was
not named as a respondent in the initial charge to the Commission. 62

IV. THE PREVAILING VIEW CRITICIZED
On its face, the language of section 2000e-5(e), specifically authorizing the filing of a civil action by the aggrieved party "against
the respondent named in the charge,"6 3 makes the prevailing interpretation that action can be brought only against the respondent
56. See Green v. McDonnell-Douglass Corp., 299 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.
Mo. 1969); Burrell v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 287 F. Supp.
289 (E.D. La. 1968).
57. Coleman, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Four Years of Procedural Elucidation,8 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1, 14 (1969-70).
58. EEOC Legal Interpretations (General Counsel Opinion Letter of
September 7, 1965), CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 17,251.083 (1965);
accord, Berg, Title VIII, A Three Years' View, 44 NoTRE DAME LAwYER 311,
317-18 (1969).
59. See, e.g., McDonald v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 308 F. Supp.
664 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp.,
F. Supp. , 60 CCH
Lab. Cas. 9266 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
60. See also McDonald v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 308 F. Supp.
664, 668 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
61. In 1968 the Commission received 15,058 charges of employment
discrimination. In 1969, 17,272 charges were received. 4 EEOC ANN. REP.
4-5 (1969). See also Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 288-89
n.22 (5th Cir. 1969).
62. See discussion at Section II of this Comment, supra.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
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to the charge, and no other, appear reasonable. The result of this
requirement, however, has sometimes been to place form over substance, often leading to the denial of the very freedom from employment discrimination which the Act was designed to eliminate.
A classic example of the dangers inherent in the prevailing view was
presented in the case of Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works.64 The
plaintiffs filed a charge with the Commission alleging racial discrimination by their employer, the Wisconsin Steelworks of the International Harvester Company. After a finding of "reasonable
cause" by the Commission and subsequent notification that conciliation efforts had failed, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court naming as defendants their employer and their union,
Local 21 of the United Order of American Bricklayers and Stone
Masons. 65 Since the union had not been named as a respondent in
the charge to the Commission, the district court, following the prevailing rule, dismissed the complaint against the union. The court
then dismissed the plaintiffs' claim against the company, since the
union and the bricklayers it represented were parties "needed for
just adjudication" under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 The harshness of this decision was noted by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals:
If this action were dismissed against both Harvester and
Local 21, plaintiffs would be forced to file new charges before the EEOC. Section 706 (d) of Title VII requires that
charges be filed with [sic] 210 days after the occurrence of
the alleged unlawful employment practice. Unless the failure to hire plaintiffs in April 1966 were considered to be a
continuing violation, new charges against Harvester and
Local 21 would be deemed
untimely and plaintiffs would be
67
left without a remedy.
The first basis for criticism of the prevailing view is that the
64. 301 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.
1970).

65. The complaint stated a cause of action under four separate statutes: Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964),
formerly 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 20 00 e to e-15 (1964); section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964); and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1964). Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427
F.2d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 1970). Only the first two causes of action are
within the scope of this Comment: the cause of action based on section 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964), formerly 14 Stat.
27 (1866), is discussed at text accompanying notes 132-37 infra.
66. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 301 F. Supp. 663, 666-67 (N.D.
Ill. 1969). FED. R. Civ. P. 19 and its application to parties in a Title VII
action is discussed at the text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
67. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 487 n.20 (7th Cir.
1970).

reasoning on which it is based is faulty. Courts have correctly interpreted the statute as placing strong emphasis on voluntary settlement through "conference, conciliation and persuasion" by the
Commission. Therefore, they have consistently ruled that the
Commission may not be completely bypassed. 68 However, it does
not necessarily follow that each person ultimately made a defendant
in a civil action must also have been a respondent to the initial
charge to accomplish this goal. The policy behind the requirement
of resort to the Commission is functional, not technical; it permits
the quickest, easiest and most inexpensive alleviation of employment discrimination possible. The preference for conciliation is
adequately fulfilled when the Commission is notified of a discriminatory practice by a given employer, employment agency, or
union against a named individual or class. Oversight or ignorance
by the lay-drafter of the charge to the Commission which leads to
the failure to name a party which may also be involved in the discriminatory practice does not sufficiently jeopardize the policy favoring conciliation by the Commission to justify a possible loss of
remedy against one or all of the discriminating parties. If the Commission is aware that certain discriminatory practices exist in a
given area, and has been able to investigate them, and is still unable
to reach a satisfactory result, the policy favoring resort to the Commission and voluntary settlement has been adequately fulfilled
to allow judicial resolution.
One of the most frequently cited reasons for requiring all defendants to be named in the charge to the Commission is to provide
notification to the charged party of the alleged violation.6 9 Of
course, each defendant in an employment discrimination case
should have notice that it has been charged. It is questionable, however, how great a role the naming of additional respondents to the
charge actually plays in giving notice. In many instances, the unnamed party (usually the union), has actual notice that a discriminatory practice is under investigation by virtue of its close association with the employer and the complainant.
In the Waters case,70 for example, the plaintiffs' primary charge
of employment discrimination was based on an amendment to the
collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the local union. During the course of the Commission's investigation of
the charge filed against the employer, an investigator for the Commission met twice with the president of the local union at which
time the union president was fully informed of the nature of the
charges filed against the employer. 1 In such instances, the preju68. Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 308 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.
1967); see cases cited note 16 supra.
69. Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
70. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
71. Id. at 487 and n.19. Such inclusion of unnamed parties by the
Commission in its efforts at conciliation seems to be a standard practice.
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dice to the unnamed party caused by the failure to make it a respondent to the Commission charge is slight.
The contention that defendants must be named in the charge
to the Commission to provide them with notice is further weakened
by the recognition that in at least one instance where the Commission failed to notify the named respondents of the charges against
78
them, as required by section 2000e-5 (a),72 an action was allowed.
The court held that the service of the charge upon the respondent by
the Commission was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing
of a suit under Title VII. 74 It should also be noted that the action in
the district court is de novo, and not a determination based on the
findings of the Commission.7 5 Therefore, all defendants in the district court action are protected by all the procedural requirements
specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which are adequate
notice to prevent unfair surprise in every other type of adjudication in the federal courts.
The second rationale for the prevailing view is that each defendant in a Title VII action must be named in the charge to provide the Commission with an opportunity to secure voluntary compliance with the Act. 76 If every charge submitted to the Commission actually reached the stage of conciliation, there would be a
great deal of merit in this contention. Since the courts have ruled,
however, that actions may be maintained where the Commission
has made no attempt at conciliation, 77 to require that each defendant in the action be previously named in the charge to the
Commission is to demand recourse to an administrative remedy
which, in many cases, is neither necessary nor available. Where the
Commission has not attempted conciliation, nothing is gained by a
requirement that all defendants be named in the charge.
"In instances of the charging party citing only one respondent, the conciliator frequently included either the union or the company as interested
parties in order to resolve the employment issue totally." 4 EEOC ANN.
REP. 9 (1969).
72. This section provides that when the Commission receives a
charge alleging employment discrimination it "shall furnish such employer,
employment agency, or labor organization . . .with a copy of such charge.
." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
73. Spell v. Local 77 IATSE,
F. Supp. , 71 L.R.R.M. 2811 (D.C.N.J.
1969).
74. Id. at 2812. See, also Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d
283, 291 (5th Cir. 1969) (court indicates a similar holding without deciding the issue).
75. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
76. Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
77. Cases holding that actions are maintainable where there was no
attempt at Commission conciliation were discussed previously at notes
49-54 and accompanying text supra.

The goal of the Act is the elimination of employment discrimination, through Commission action where possible, but in all other
instances by court order. This policy is not served by decisions
which dismiss complaints against individuals charged with discrimination without a trial on the merits. In most instances, the failure
to name a defendant as a party has resulted only in the dismissal of
the action against the unnamed party.7 8 While this procedure often
affords some relief to the aggrieved party, there is a good possibility
that the relief granted is incomplete due to the absence of one or
more involved parties.7 9 The Commission recognizes that "when
co-respondents are named, conciliation is more effective and comprehensive. 80 There is no reason to assume that the same is not
also true as to the presence of all involved parties in the judicial
resolution of alleged employment discrimination. By strictly limiting civil actions under Title VII to those parties who were respondents in the charge to the Commission, the prevailing rule has
limited the scope and availability of judicial relief to the victims
of employment discrimination. This narrow construction of the
Act is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute and the liberal
interpretation accorded other procedural issues.81 As long as the
private suit remains the sole method of compelling those who violate the law to comply with its provisions, 2 it is essential that the
procedural provisions be liberally construed to effectuate the broad
purpose of the Act and not be used as "stumbling blocks" to deny
relief to those whom the Act was designed to protect.
V. LIMITED JOINDER PERMITTED

As yet, no court has explicitly rejected the prevailing interpretation. In several instances, however, plaintiffs have been permitted to join defendants who were not named in charges before the
Commission.8 3 In general, these exceptions have arisen in one of
three situations: (1) where the court has determined that an
agency relationship exists between the respondent named in the
charge to the Commission and the unnamed party which the plaintiff is seeking to join in the action;8 4 (2) where the joinder of the
78. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1969); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
79. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
80. 4 EEOC ANN. REP. 9 (1969).
81. See discussion at Section III of this Comment supra.
82. 4 EEOC ANN.REP., Facts About Title VII, (1969):
Legislation is currently before the Congress which would enable the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to seek enforcement of its determinations in the Federal courts, should conciliation efforts fail. The Commission regards such authority as
essential and recommends its prompt passage.
83. Cases cited note 17 supra.
84. McDonald v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 308 F. Supp. 664 (N.D.
Ill.
1970); Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp.,
F. Supp.
, 60 CCH Lab. Cas.
J 9926 (S.D. Tex. 1969). Contra, Butler v. Local 4, Laborers' Union, 308
F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
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unnamed party is necessary to prevent wasteful or inconsistent
results or when no purpose would be served by further Commission
action;8 5 (3) where the plaintiff based the court's jurisdiction of the
case on section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,86 thus avoiding
the necessity of compliance with the procedural steps necessary to
the initiation of a suit based on Title VII.

s'

As noted earlier, most of the charges received by the Commission are "homemade,"88 and the provision for the appointment of
counsel is not applicable until Commission action has been completed and the aggrieved party's only recourse is to a civil action. 9
An attorney coming into the case at this juncture faces serious disabilities in those instances where the original charge to the Commission did not name all possible defendants. In order to have any
chance of broadening the relief available to his client by making
defendants of unnamed parties, he generally must plead jurisdiction
over the unnamed party based on one of the three grounds listed
above.
A. Agency
The most frequently attempted method of obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant who was not named in the original charge has
been an effort to show the existence of an agency relationship between the respondent in the original charge and the party to be
joined. 90 The most liberal finding of an agency relation sufficient
to permit the joinder of an unnamed defendant is found in Taylor v.
Armco Steel CorpY1 In his charge to the Commission the plaintiff
named Armco Steel and Local 2708 of the United Steelworker's
Union as the respondents. The complaint filed in district court,
however, also named the international union as a defendant. The
international union moved to dismiss the action against it, since it
85. State v. Baugh Constr. Co., 313 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Wash. 1969);
Bremer v. St. Louis-S.W.R.R., 310 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964), formerly 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
87. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
Contra, Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp.,
F. Supp.
, 2 F.E.P.
Cases 561 (N.D. Okla.Feb. 25, 1970).
88. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 20e-5(e) (1964) provides that "[u]pon application
by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just,
the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant .. "
90. Cases cited note 84 supra. See also Mickel v. South Carolina State
Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1968) (dictum); Sokolowski
v. Swift & Co., 286 F. Supp. 775, 782 (D.Minn. 1968) (dictum); Moody v.
Albermarle Paper Co., 271 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D.N.C. 1968) (dictum).
91.
F. Supp. ,60 CCH Lab. Cas. t 9266 (S.D. Tex. 1969).

was not a respondent to the charge before the Commission. In denying the international union's motion to dismiss, the court recognized
that "[t]he Act obviously contemplates the aggrieved individual
will join all parties with whom he has a grievance in his charge
before the Commission ....,,92 The court also noted that a number of decisions have construed section 2000e-5(e) of the Act to
mean that a plaintiff's failure to name the international union as a
respondent precludes its being named as a defendant in a civil action.93 In declining to follow these decisions the court stated:
"However, this construction is not absolute."9 4 The court reasoned
that section 2000e-l (d) of the Act,9 5 which defines a labor organization to include its agents, will permit the joinder of the international
union "if it can be shown that the local union is, for some purposes,
the agent of the international. . ."96 The court found that the
facts indicated "much more than a simple 'affiliation'" between
Local 2708 and the international union and permitted the joinder of
the international.9 7 The holding in Armco Steel was foreshadowed
by dicta in a series of opinions which refused to join the unnamed
party based on agency but which indicated that the result could be
different if an adequate agency relationship was proven.9 8
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois specifically rejected the holding of Armco Steel in Butler v. Local 4, Laborers' Union.99 The Butler court refused to apply the definition
of "labor organization" found in section 2000e-l(d) 00 to permit
joinder of the union district council in an action where only the
local union had been named as a respondent in a charge to the
Commission. The action against the district council of the union
was dismissed. 01
Defining a labor organization to include its agents delineates the scope of application of the sections of Title VII
prohibiting unlawful employment practices. It does not
suggest that the term "respondent" as used in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e) has the same meaning. According to the definition, the activities of agents of labor organizations are
subject to the provisions of Title VII. However, the charging of one before the EEOC does not make a respondent of
92. Id. 9266 at 6604.
93. Id.
94. Id. (emphasis in original).
95. This section provides: "the term 'labor organization' means a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any
agent of such organization...

"

(emphasis added).

(d) (1964).
96. Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp.,
9266 at 6604.
97. Id.
98. Cases cited note DOsupra.
99. 308 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (d) (1964).

supra.

F. Supp.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1

, 60 CCH Lab. Cas.

For applicable text see note 95

101. Butler v. Local 4, Laborers' Union, 308 F. Supp. 528, 531 (N.D.
I. 1969).
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the other.
However, the court recognized that " [t] he situation may be different where there is substantial identity between the parties
"103

In a more recent case, McDonald v. American Federation of
Musicians,10 4 the Butler court elaborated on the distinction between
an agency relationship and "substantial identity," and the circumstances when it would permit the joinder of defendants who were
not respondents in the charge to the Commission. 0 " The court affirmed its decision in Butler but went on to find that "where there
is substantial identity between the defendants" a defendant could
be joined with those who had been respondents, even if he was not
named in the charge, since "no useful purpose would be served" by
the filing of another charge with the Commission.'"6
Viewed together, the cases permitting the joinder of defendants
who were not respondents to the charge before the Commission
based on agency do not present a very large exception to the majority rule. Although a number of cases have attempted such
joinder, with the exception of the Armco Steel case, the courts have
been reluctant to base jurisdiction on a simple agency relationship. 10 7 Whenever possible, the attorney for the aggrieved person
should attempt to etablish "substantial identity" between the party
named in the charge and the party he seeks to join in the action.
The possibility of joinder may be enhanced if the attorney can
show actual notice by the unnamed party as well as a legal relationship in the nature of agency between the respondent to the
charge and the party he seeks to join in the action. 08

102.

Id.

103. Id.
104. 308 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
105. Id. at 669.
106. The court accepted jurisdiction over the recording secretary of
the local union even though he had not been a respondent in the charge
to the Commission. The complaint involved the collection of allegedly
discriminatory fees by the local union. Since the recording secretary collected the fees, the court concluded that there was "substantial identity"
between the parties so that any investigation of the charges against the
local union must have included the recording secretary. Id. at 669.
107. Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239
(4th Cr. 1968); Butler v. Local 4, Laborers' Union, 308 F. Supp. 528 (N.D.
Ill. 1969); Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., 286 F. Supp. 775 (D. Minn. 1968);
Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 271 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
108. See, e.g., McDonald v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 308 F. Supp.
665 (N.D. Ill.
1969).

B. Exceptions Arising out of a Concern for the Orderly Administrationof Justice
Two well reasoned decisions' 0 9 have disregarded the prevailing
view and permitted Title VII actions against parties who were
never named as respondents in a charge before the Commission. In
Bremer v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R., 0 the court actually ordered the plaintiff to join her union and the individual holding the
disputed position despite the fact that neither party had been
named in the charge to the Commission."' The case arose out of an
allegation of sexual discrimination in the railroad's promotion practices. Noting that "prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, disputes of this nature were unquestionably solely within
the province of the Railway Adjustment Board," the court ruled
that Title VII "created an additional remedy without eliminating
the prior one.""n 2 Since there were two separate avenues of relief
available, the court felt constrained to join all parties involved in
the situation to avoid the hazard of "possible inconsistencies and
fragmentation."'1
In State v. Baugh Construction Co.,11 4 the court permitted a
Title VII action to be maintained even though no formal charge had
been filed with the Commission."' While this was admittedly a
rather extraordinary situation, it nevertheless evidences a judicial
attitude which is willing to take jurisdiction of a Title VII action
when resort to the detailed procedures established in the Act
le
would be "frivolous."'
The Baugh case arose out of a series of legal" 7 and public confrontations concerning the employment of minority group tradesmen on public construction projects in the Greater Seattle area.
After a series of demonstrations by minority groups, the contractors
agreed to hire more minority trainees, whereupon the unions
109.
State v.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Bremer v. St. Louis-S.W.R.R., 310 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1969);
Baugh Constr. Co., 313 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
310 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1339.
Id. at 339-40. The court stated:
There is only one job in dispute. The individual now holding
that job and the union representing him are not now parties to
this suit. Any judgment in this suit is not binding upon those not
parties to this suit. If plaintiff were to prevail, the individual
in the disputed position may well decide to initiate and pursue
proceedings for reinstatement under the collective bargaining
agreement and the Railway Labor Act, with the possibility of an
inconsistent result. At best there would be fragmentation and
duplication of proceedings. At worst there would be confusion, a
multiplicity of proceedings involving the same facts, and two persons entitled to one position.
Id. at 1339-40.
114. 313 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
115. Id. at 605.
116. Id.
117. See also Central Contractors Ass'n v. Local 46, IBEW, 312 F. Supp.
1388 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
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walked off the job site and another series of demonstrations ensued. Although no charge had been filed with the Commission, it
had been actively engaged in attempting to resolve the major issues
in conflict. 1 8 Therefore, when the complaint was filed alleging
jurisdiction under Title VII, the court held that resort to the procedural requirements for the institution of a Title VII suit would be
to no avail and that speedy court action was of greater importance. 119 Although the circumstances surrounding this decision
are diferent from most actions covered by Title VII, this case does
provide precedent for a ruling that resort to the Commission is not
a jurisdictional prerequisite where all the defendants are aware of
the charges against them and further resort to settlement by "conference conciliation and persuasion" would be useless.
The decisions in both Bremer and Baugh deal with rather specialized circumstances. The type of reasoning they apply toward
resolving the conflicts between the substance and procedure of Title
VII, however, could well be applied to less specialized situations
where it appears that strict adherence to the procedural requirement that all defendants be respondents before the Commission
may limit the scope of judicial enforcement of the Act or prevent
enforcement entirely.
C. Obtaining Jurisdictionunder the Civil Rights Act of 1866
The third method of obtaining jurisdiction over defendants
who were not named in a charge to the Commission goes outside
the confines of Title VII and places jurisdiction in the federal courts
by virtue of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.120 When the
Supreme Court revived the long dormant 1866 Civil Rights Act in
the landmark case of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 121 it opened a
whole new area of potential122federal court jurisdiction over private
employment discrimination.
118. State v. Baugh Constr. Co., 313 F. Supp. 598, 605 (W.D. Wash. 1969).

119. Id.
120. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31,
14 Stat. 27 is divided into two sections in the current code:
1981. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make
and enforce contracts ...

1982.

as is enjoyed by white citizens....

All citizens of the United States shall have the same right

• . . as is enjoyed by white citizens ...

to inherit, purchase, lease,

sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
42 U.S.C. § 1981-82 (1964), formerly 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
121. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
122. See generally Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. CHi. L. REV. 615 (1969).

The question which has yet to be revolved conclusively is
whether the right to "make and enforce contracts" guaranteed by
section 1981123 provides an independent cause of action for racial
employment discrimination in addition to the protection afforded
by Title VII. In the Jones decision, the Supreme Court seemed to
indicate that section 1981 does provide a cause of action for private
discrimination. 1 24 This interpretation was adopted and applied in
Dobbins v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 125 to
permit an action based on section 1981 by a Negro against his union
for discriminatory job referral practices. 126 The two most recent
cases to consider this issue have, after extensive analysis, reached
directly contradictory holdings on the availability of a cause of action under section 1981 as a remedy for private racial employment
7
12

discrimination.

In Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp.12 8 the court refused to recognize section 1981 as an independent jurisdictional
basis for a suit to prevent private employment discrimination. In
refusing to recognize a cause of action for employment discrimination based on section 1981 the court stated that "to construe 42
U.S.C. section 1981 as supporting this court's subject matter jurisdiction . . . would make Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
a redundancy and in large part an absurdity.' 29 In reaching this
conclusion the court emphasized the widespread feeling that Congress, in enacting Title VII, was entering a new field of legislation. 3 0
The court also noted that if an action were permitted under section
1981, the whole statutory scheme of investigation and conciliation
established in Title VII as the primary means of eliminating employment discrimination could be bypassed. 13 1
A limited cause of action based on section 1981 was recognized,
however, in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works. 1 2 The court in123. That portion of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which
guarantees equal contract rights is now found in section 1981 of the current code and will hereinafter be referred to as section 1981.
124. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 n.78 (1968).
The court overruled Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), which
had refused to apply section 1981 to a situation in which a group of white
men had terrorized several Negroes to prevent them from working in a
sawmill.
125. 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
126. The court stated:
At least since Jones v. Mayer, a strictly private right, be it in
the property field as such, or the contract field as such, is within
the protection of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 against interference
by a private citizen or a group of citizens.
Id. at 442.
127. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970);
Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp.,
F. Supp.
,2 F.E.P. Cases
561 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 25, 1970).
128.
F. Supp.
, 2 F.E.P. Cases 561 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 25, 1970).
129. Id. at 564.
130. Id. at 564-65.
131. Id.
132. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the facts of the
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terpreted section 1981 as a prohibition of private job discrimination, but recognized that "the difficulties in reconciling section 1981
and Title VII are great and that the areas of possible conflict are
numerous."1 33 Since Title VII does not expressly repeal any prior
legislation, the only basis on which jurisdiction under section 1981
could be denied would be a finding that this section was repealed
by implication by Title VII. Relying on "the cardinal rule . . .
that repeals by implication are not favored," as stated by the Supreme Court in Posadas v. National City Bank,184 the court in Waters determined that the absolute right to sue under section 1981
was modified by the "strong preference for resolution of disputes
by conciliation rather than court action" expressed in Title VII.J35
Accordingly, the court held that "an aggrieved person may sue directly under section 1981 if he pleads a reasonable excuse for his
failure to exhaust EEOC remedies."' 36 In this case sufficient "reasonable excuse" was found and an action under section 1981 was
permitted against the employer and the union where the original
charge to the Commission, which had been drafted by a layman,
failed to name the union as a respondent and it appeared that the
13 7
union had actual notice of the charges against the employer. '
Should the holding of the Waters case, that jurisdiction over
employment discrimination suits is permissible under section 1981
where the plaintiff can show reasonable excuse for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under Title VII, become the accepted view, it will undoubtedly be of great assistance to plainWaters case and the district court decision which this decision reversed, see
the text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
133. Id. at 485.
134. 296 U.S. 497 (1936).
In this case the Supreme Court established
rules governing repeal by implication:
The cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored.
Where there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be
given to both is possible. There are two well-established categories of repeals by implication-(1) where the provisions of the two
acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the latter act to the extent of the
conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and (2)
if the latter act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act.
Id. at 503.
135. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 486 (7th Cir. 1970).
136. Id. at 487.
137. Id. The concurring opinion in the Waters case would have permitted the action based on Title VII jurisdiction without resort to section 1981. Based on the facts of the case the opinion writer felt
that a strict reading of the statutory authorization of an action
"against the respondent named in the charge" [was] unwarranted
and that the plaintiff could properly bring an action against both
the employer and the union.
Id. at 492 (concurring opinion).

tiffs' attorneys who come into the case at the trial stage and are
faced with a defective charge to the Commission. The decision
seems to indicate that the failure of the aggrieved party to name all
defendants in his charge before the Commission is, by itself, a reasonable excuse sufficient to justify jurisdiction under section
1981.138 Even a wide acceptance of this view, however, does not
obviate the desirability of a more liberal interpretation of the rerequirement in section 2000e-5(e) of Title VII that an action may
be brought "against the respondent named in the charge." As the
Supreme Court pointed out at the beginning of the Jones decision,
the Civil Rights Act of 1866139 "deals only with racial discrimination .
-. 140 The more comprehensive provisions of Title VII, on

the other hand, prohibit discrimination based on sex, religion, and
national origin as well as discrimination based on race or color.
There is no justification for a rule that would permit the joinder
of defendants who were not respondents in the charge to the Commission in cases involving racial discrimination (based on section
1981) and deny similar latitude to plaintiffs filing charges of sex
discrimination under Title VII.
VI.

AN

ALTERNATE MEANS OF PERMITTING JOINDER

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed an
amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiff in the Waters case outlining a
procedure which could be followed in instances where necessary
parties have not been named as respondents before the Commission.141 Under their proposal, the district court would stay further
proceedings pending the filing of a charge by the plaintiff against
the unnamed defendant. The action would then revert to the Commission for another attempt at conciliation. Should the Commission again fail to reach a voluntary settlement, the plaintiff would
be able to join the now-named defendant and proceed to judgment
in the district court, having fulfilled all of the prerequisites to civil
14
action. 142 Such a procedure is authorized in section 2000e-5(e) 1
1 44
and has been followed in two cases.
Assuming that in such a situation the time limits for filing
charges of alleged discrimination 45 would be waived, such a pro138. 427 F.2d at 487-88.
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1964), formerly 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
140. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
141. The Commission's amicus brief is reported in the concurring opinion of Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 492 (7th Cir. 1970).
142. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 492 (7th Cir.
1970).
143. This section provides that "[u]pon request, the court may, in its
discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending
the termination of . . .the efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary
compliance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
144. Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 414 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1969); Local
329, ILA v. South Atl. & Gulf Coast Dist., ILA, 295 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex.
1968).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964). See note 5 supra.
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cedure might permit a more complete opportunity for a negotiated
settlement. As was noted earlier, 1 6 the Commission has achieved
greater success in reaching voluntary compliance when it has been
able to deal with all parties to the discriminatory practices. This
increased possibility of settlement must be balanced, however,
against the additional delay which it would occasion and the attendant possibility that an agreeable conciliation could still not be
achieved, resulting in the same civil action being filed at a later
date. While this procedure is preferable to the prevailing interpretation, since it merely delays settlement rather than denying
relief altogether, it should not be a mandatory requirement where
an attempt is made to join defendants who were not respondents
before the Commission. In those instances, for example, where
the unnamed defendant had actual notice of the charges before
the Commission and was a party to the conciliation efforts, further
attempts at voluntary compliance would appear futile. In other
instances, as where the plaintiff would suffer additional injury by
further delay, the court should be able to proceed without further
resort to the Commission.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Discrimination is still pervasive in America. The challenge
to make equal employment opportunity a reality for all
Americans, regardless of race, color, religion,
sex or na147
tional origin, is greater than ever before.
The enactment of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 signaled the beginning in earnest of one of the most difficult, yet
most important, tasks of our time: the elimination of all forms of
employment discrimination. The size of the problem is matched
only by the urgency with which we must confront it. Most of those
involved in this struggle have recognized that the failure of Title
VII to grant enforcement power to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a serious drawback. Since most of the compulsory enforcement of the Act must come from private litigation,
it is essential that the courts interpret the procedural requirements
of Title VII in a manner which is consistent with its overall purpose. Title VII, like any major enactment, has forced the courts
to determine first the procedural grounds on which the Act will be
enforced. The liberal judicial interpretation of such procedural
questions as the formality required in the charge, the flexibility
permitted in actual Commission action and the availability of class
146. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
147. 4 EEOC ANN. REP. 2 (1969).

actions, will certainly aid in the elimination of employment discrimination. A similarly liberal interpretation of the statute to
permit the joinder of defendants at trial, who were not previously
named as respondents in a charge before the Commission, is now
in order.
The groundwork for such an interpretation has been laid. The
courts have already recognized that on its face the language of section 2000e-5(e) does not demand that the complaint name each defendant in a charge to the Commission as a prerequisite to civil
action. The prevailing rule that requires each defendant in the civil
action to have been before the Committion is judge-made. It was
founded on a sincere effort by the courts to give effect to an important policy expressed in the Act favoring voluntary settlement
where possible. However, the prevailing rule is in error insofar
as it creates a purely procedural barrier to complete judicial relief.
The prime policy the courts should endeavor to enforce in their procedural determinations is the policy which lies at the center of the
Act: the elimination of employment discrimination, by conciliation if possible, but by compulsion if necessary.
Hopefully, the judicial preference for enforcing the spirit of
the Act will permit an extension of jurisdiction over defendants
who were not named in the charge to the Commission. The three
instances in which jurisdiction may be obtained 148 are entirely too
limited, both in scope and in acceptance, to insure that adequate relief from employment discrimination will be granted in all cases.
THOMAS W. SCOTT

148.

See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.

